Working Paper 81 - Re-Orienting Public Management in Africa: Selected Issues and Some Country Experiences by Ladipo Adamolekun
African Development Bank 
 
 








 Re-Orienting Public Management in Africa: 














Economic Research Working Paper  
No 81 (November 2005) 
 
The views and interpretations in this paper are those of the author(s) and do 
not necessarily represent those of the African Development Bank. 
 













African Development Bank 
 
 
African Development Bank 
Angle des trois rues: Avenue du Ghana, Rue Pierre de Coubertin, Rue Hedi Nouira 
BP. 323 
1002 Tunis Belvedere 
Tunisia 
TEL: (+216) 71 333 511 / 7110 3450 









Rights and Permissions 
 
All rights reserved. 
 
The text and data in this publication may be reproduced as long as the source is cited. 
Reproductions for commercial purposes are forbidden. 
 
The African Development Bank disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the 
exchange of ideas about economic research and policy issues in Africa. Our main objective is to 
disseminate findings quickly, so we compromise and bear with presentations that are not fully 
polished. The papers are signed by the author(s) and should be cited and referred accordingly. 
The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the 
author(s). They do not necessarily represent the view of the African Development Bank, its Board 
of Directors, or the countries they represent. 
 
Working Papers are available online at http://www.afdb.org/ 
 




Re-Orienting Public Management in Africa: 






The objective of this paper is to examine some aspects of the efforts aimed at re-orienting 
public management in Africa since the early 1990s. The paper begins with a review of the 
background to the re-orientation exercise: the decline of the public administration 
systems in a majority of countries that was accompanied, in some cases, with the collapse 
of the state. In the second chapter, some selected issues in re-orienting public 
management are examined. One of the selected issues, the politics and administration 
nexus, which is at the heart of the conduct of government business, is further examined in 
depth in the third chapter. The fourth chapter is devoted to specific country experiences 
of good and bad practices, including attention to key lessons from each case. The fifth 
and final chapter contain first a brief reflection on how countries can achieve better and 
sustainable public management reform results, and second, some thoughts on the 
desirability of introducing and implementing an “African administrative space” within 
the framework of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD).  
 
Résumé 
L’objectif de ce document est d’examiner certains aspects des efforts consentis depuis le 
début des années 90 pour réorienter la gestion publique en Afrique. Il commence par un 
examen du contexte global de l’exercice de réorientation : le déclin des systèmes 
d’administration publique dans la majorité des pays qui a été accompagné, dans certains 
cas, de l’effondrement de l’état. Le deuxième chapitre passe en revue certaines questions 
choisies de réorientation de la gestion publique. L’une de ces questions, le couple 
politique-administration, qui est au cœur de la gestion des activités gouvernementales, est 
examiné à fond dans le troisième chapitre. Le quatrième chapitre est consacré aux 
expériences nationales spécifiques de bonnes et mauvaises pratiques, y compris l’intérêt 
accordé aux enseignements tirés de chaque cas. Le cinquième et dernier chapitre contient 
une brève réflexion sur la manière dont les pays peuvent obtenir des résultats meilleurs et 
durables en ce qui concerne la réforme de la gestion publique, ainsi que certaines 
réflexions sur l’opportunité d’introduire et de mettre en œuvre un « espace administratif 
africain  » dans le cadre du Nouveau partenariat pour le développement de l’Afrique 
(NEPAD). 
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 Chapter 1: Background – The Decline of Public Administration 
Systems 
 
At independence, most countries in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) inherited public 
administration (PA) systems that performed two key functions of a modern state fairly 
satisfactorily: assuring the continuity of the state and maintaining law and order within 
each country’s territorial areas. Most countries moved quickly to recruit and train 
nationals to replace the departing colonial officials and to assure the steady supply of 
trained men and women for their expanding public services. There was also a re-
orientation of the service delivery function of the PA from the interests of the colonial 
countries to those of the new states. In many cases, this meant more rapid expansion of 
the provision of services in agriculture, the social sector, and infrastructure than was the 
case during the preceding decades of colonial rule. The functions of the public services 
were further expanded through the establishment of many public enterprises that were 
operated with varying degrees of autonomy from the civil services that were at the heart 
of the machinery of government in each country. Another significant re-orientation was 
making the PA accountable to national political leaders and the public instead of the 
erstwhile accountability to colonial masters. In general, the momentum for nurturing a 
development-oriented PA was maintained up to the mid-1970s in most countries.
1  
 
At different times from the late 1970s through the 1980s, the rot set in and a decline of 
the PA system in many SSA countries became noticeable. Significantly, the onset of the 
decline coincided with a steady collapse of commodity prices and the weakening of the 
economies of many countries (the exceptions were the mineral producing countries), 
widespread political instability, and the accession to power of political leaders (many of 
them military officers) who undermined rather than nurtured PA institutions. (Other 
public sector institutions suffered the same fate, notably universities). By the late 1980s, 
there was widespread acknowledgment of a development crisis in SSA and the decline of 
the PA in the majority of the countries was just one of the manifestations, albeit a critical 
one, given its responsibility for the important state functions mentioned above. The main 
dimensions of the development crisis were summarized by the World Bank (1989) as 
follows: 
A root cause of weak economic performance in the past has been the failure of public 
institutions. Private sector initiative and market mechanisms are important, but they must 
go hand-in-hand with good governance – a public service that is efficient, a judicial 
system that is reliable, and an administration that is accountable to its public. And a better 
balance is needed between the government and the governed. […..] Underlying the litany 
of Africa’s development problems is a crisis of governance. By governance is meant the 
exercise of political power to manage a nation’s affairs. Because countervailing power 
has been lacking, state officials in many countries have served their own interests without 
fear of being called to account… Politics becomes personalized, and patronage becomes 
                                                 
1 One notable exception was Congo-Kinshasa (later re-named Zaire and now called Democratic Republic of 
Congo). It inherited a very weak public administration that was unable to help maintain the continuity of 
the state when the country was enveloped in political crisis within months of attaining its independence in 
1960. It was a case of failed decolonization, in which the departing colonial power is alleged to have played 
a key role.   2 
 
 
essential to maintain power. The leadership assumes broad discretionary authority and 
loses legitimacy. Information is controlled, and voluntary associations are co-opted or 
disbanded. This environment cannot readily support a dynamic economy.   
 
During the early 1990s, events in SSA evolved in two diametrically opposed directions: 
on the one hand, the governance crisis deepened in a few states, culminating in the 
phenomenon of failed states (for example, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Somalia) or failing 
states (for example, Angola, Burundi, Sudan, and Zaire), suffering from civil strife or 
civil wars of varying magnitude; on the other hand, many states were joining the 
worldwide waves of democratization and economic liberalization. (The latter is also 
referred to as the installation of market-friendly economies). Significantly, the two waves 
broadly relate to the interlinked problems of bad governance and poor economic 
performance highlighted in the two extracts cited above. Given the critical functions that 
a PA system performs in the modern state as mentioned in the opening paragraph and 
echoed in one of the two extracts, it is not surprising that reversing its decline was one of 
the priority actions of the countries that embraced both democratization and economic 
liberalization.  
 
Chapter 2: Re-Orienting Public Management – Selected Issues 
 
2.1  Context of Public Management Reforms 
 
As mentioned above, the public management reforms that were launched in many 
African countries in the early 1990s and whose implementation continues to the present 
were linked to their simultaneous embrace of democratization and market economies 
(commonly used as synonym of economic liberalization). The following are the main 
features of the new political and economic contexts of public management reforms. 
 
2.1.a. Political context  
Adoption of a democratic governmental system has three main implications for public 
administration. First, the appointed officials who run the public administration system are 
accountable to elected officials who derive their mandate to govern from the sovereign 
people. The key function that links the two groups of officials together are the 
formulation and implementation of public policies. Normally, elected officials determine 
policies that are expected to reflect the public’s demands while the elected officials are to 
faithfully implement the policies whose results are in the form of services delivered to the 
public. This distinction between the responsibility of elected officials for policy 
formulation and that of appointed officials for policy implementation is not water-tight: 
appointed officials provide inputs into policy formulation while elected officials, both in 
the executive arm of government and in the legislative arm, are involved in policy 
implementation, notably in its monitoring and evaluation.  
 
A second implication of democratic politics for public administration is the requirement 
that public servants should be politically neutral (or apolitical). One dimension to 
political neutrality is the need to ensure that public officials, who would be in permanent 
employment, would be available to serve successive groups of elected governments that 
would emerge from competitive free and fair elections. (An incumbent government’s   3 
 
 
policies might differ in significant respects from that of its successor). A second 
dimension to political neutrality is the need for public servants to treat all citizens fairly 
and impartially (regardless of their differing partisan political viewpoints) in the 
provision of services; see Diagram 1. 
 



















Notes to Diagram 1: The triad that represents the relationships of politicians, 
administrators and the public has four key dimensions: 
(i)  public-politician (gives mandate, accompanied by demands), 
(ii)  politician-administrator (determines policies for administrator to implement 
and holds him/her accountable for same), 
(iii)  administrator-public (translates policies into goods and services for the public 
and treats all citizens fairly and impartially), and 
(iv) public-politician-administrator-public (complex web of relationships that 
could also operate in the reverse direction). 
 
The third implication of democratic politics for public administration that emerged only 
in the last half century in most of the old democracies and assumed prominence in all 
democracies, old and new, since the 1990s is the need for public participation in both the 
determination of policies and in their implementation. These three concepts – 
accountability, political neutrality and participation – are reflected in varying degrees in 
the public management reforms introduced in many SSA countries since the early 1990s.  
 
2.1.b. Economic context  
The major consequence of the adoption of a market economy by many African countries 
in the early 1990s was the need for a new balance in the respective roles of the state and 
market in running national economies. In almost every case, it meant the abandonment of 
the idea of the state as the “engine of growth” (inherited from the former colonial rulers), 
and transmuted into a “socialist path” to development (for example, Guinea and 
Tanzania) or a “mixed economy” with the state controlling the “commanding heights”   4 
 
 
(for example, Nigeria). Under the new state-market balance, the state is to play a reduced 
role in national economic management and in some countries, there is an explicit shift 
from state-led growth to private sector-led growth. The state is to provide an enabling 
environment for private sector economic activities by implementing appropriate 
economic policy reforms and providing the necessary regulatory framework. It is also 
expected to provide some of the social and physical infrastructure, sometimes in 
partnership with the private sector. A major indication of the changes is the privatization 
of erstwhile public enterprises (PEs) or state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that has been 
taking place in many SSA countries. As is the case with the new political context, the 
developments associated with the new economic context are reflected in varying degrees 
in the public management reforms introduced in many SSA countries since the early 
1990s. There is another politico-economic international trend to which SSA countries 
have also had to adjust since the 1990s: globalization. While globalization pre-dated the 
new wave of democratization of the early 1990s, it assumed a much higher profile than 
ever before during that decade and has continued to influence both political and 
economic developments in all modern states. The consequences of globalization for 
public management reform efforts will also be considered in this paper. 
 
2.2  Public Management Reforms at the Central Government Level 
 
The two main elements of public management reforms at the central government level 
are civil service reforms and public enterprise reforms. The section on civil service 
reforms reviews first some major influences for civil service reforms (drawing partly on 
Adamolekun, 1999 and 2002) and provides then an assessment of civil service reforms in 
Africa. The section on public enterprise reforms draws partly on Laleye (1999). 
  
2.2.a. Civil service reforms 
The most critical public administration institution at the central government level is the 
civil service and it was logical that it was a major focus of attention in the public 
management reforms launched in the 1990s in most SSA countries. In general, each 
country with a public management reform program sought to rehabilitate its civil service 
system. Regardless of whether the reform program was home grown or introduced within 
the context of structural adjustment programs financed by multilateral and bilateral 
donors, they had two common influences. First, there was the influence of some elements 
of the “Weberian model” of career civil service inherited by the countries at 
independence that still had relevance within the new political and economic contexts. The 
idea of a body of permanent officials appointed to assist successive political executive 
teams in formulating and implementing governmental policies as mentioned in the 
section on “political context” above is a good example. Three other elements of the 
Weberian model that have had continued relevance are the concept of political neutrality 
(for the two reasons highlighted in the section on the political context), the principle of 
recruitment on merit and an emphasis on efficiency in the conduct of government 
business.  
 
The problems that needed to be fixed in these areas were the significant modifications 
that took place in the 1970s and 1980s (decades of crises in public administration   5 
 
 
systems) in many SSA countries: meritocracy was diluted in varying degrees (amounting 
to abandonment in a few cases) and politicization was rampant (in the name of one party 
ideology or patronage politics under civilian and military rulers). Tackling these 
problems was a tough challenge in itself but it was made more difficult by the need to 
simultaneously cope with the demands of another influence, the international public 
sector modernization movement launched in some industrialized countries in the 1980s 
(notably Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and United States) called the 
“new public management (NPM). Drawing from public choice theory, from the new 
institutional economics, and from recent management theories (especially business 
motivation theories), the NPM seeks to apply market principles to governmental 
administration, with an emphasis on competition, contracting, and customer orientation. 
It also emphasizes merit-based recruitment and promotion and increased autonomy for 
managers (“letting managers manage”) with corresponding responsibility, performance-
related pay, continuous skills development and upgrading. There is also an emphasis on 
performance measurement, with particular attention to the delivery of services to the 
public.  
 
With the advantage of hindsight, one can now assert that public management reform 
programs in SSA countries that sought to simultaneously fix the problems of the elements 
of the Weberian model that were still relevant to the political and economic contexts of 
the early 1990s whilst introducing elements borrowed from NPM were over-ambitious. 
The sequencing in the older democracies (who constitute the majority of the membership 
of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD) is that the 
Weberian model had been in operation for close to a century in most cases before NPM 
was introduced. It is also important to stress that the social, political and economic factors 
that underpinned the public management institutions in these OECD countries when 
NPM was introduced in the 1980s and 1990s were vastly different from those in all the 
SSA countries: good performing economies that could finance the institutions; well 
functioning political systems, including respect for the rule of law; and well developed 
educational systems that provided both trained manpower and fairly enlightened 
citizenry.  
 
Drawing on three existing assessments of civil service rehabilitation efforts in 29 SSA 
countries, i.e., Adamolekun (1999), Council for the Development of Social Science 
Research in Africa (2002), and Levy and Kpundeh (2004), Table 1 divides the countries 
into four groups (though none of these three assessments have used the suggested four-
part categorization).   
 
The first group comprises a few countries where the public administration decline 
summarized in Chapter 1 did not take place because the inherited tradition of merit-based 
and politically neutral civil service system was maintained and nurtured (for example, 
Botswana and Mauritius).
2  
                                                 
2 Up to 1990, Namibia and South Africa were one country under the infamous apartheid system. Because of 
its racial exclusion policy, the similarities in institutional capacity, socio-economic development between it 
and Botswana and Mauritius cannot be described as virtuous. However, post-independent Namibia and 




Table 1:  Classification of Countries by Levels of Civil Service Rehabilitation Efforts 
 
A.  Advanced 
Reformers 





D.  Beginners and Non-
starters (“vicious 
cycle”) 
     
Botswana Benin  Cote  d’Ivoire   Democratic Republic of 
Congo 
Mauritius Burkina  Faso  Gabon Burundi 
Namibia  Ethiopia  Guinea  Central Africa Republic
South Africa  Ghana  Nigeria  Liberia 
 Kenya  Togo  Sierra  Leone 
 Mali  Zimbabwe  Somalia 
 Mauritania    Sudan 
 Rwanda     
 Senegal     
 Tanzania     
 Uganda     
 Zambia     
 
 







Notes to Table 1: 
1.  This categorization is a snapshot that represents overall position of countries 
during the entire 15-odd years covered in the review, especially the last half-
dozen years.  A categorization of the same countries for 1995 and 1999 will show 
different placements for several countries in B and C including Rwanda that 
would have been in category D in 1995.  The placement of countries in Groups A 
and D would have remained unchanged. 
2.  Information on the countries provided as examples is based partly on assessments 
provided in the three sources cited, and partly on the author’s first-hand 
observations during professional visits to all but one of the countries in Groups A, 
B, and C between 1990 and 2004. 
 
 
The same countries made reasonable progress in socio-economic development and were, 
therefore, able to finance the cost of nurturing their civil service systems: providing 
decent pay levels for officials; funding educational institutions at fairly adequate levels to 
assure supply of trained manpower (expatriate technical assistants paid by the 
government were recruited to fill gaps in declining numbers); and progressively 
consolidating democratic political culture, including respect for the rule of law, thereby   7 
 
 
providing an enabling governance environment that helped retention of trained national 
experts and encouraged both domestic and foreign investment that contributed to 
economic growth. In a sense, these developments constitute a kind of virtuous cycle. 
Namibia and South Africa would qualify to be included in this group of countries. In both 
Botswana and South Africa, the nurturing of a career civil service remains a priority of 
the governments even when a dose of NPM-style contract appointment was introduced in 
the late 1990s for the chief administrative heads of ministries, departments and agencies 
(MDAs) of the central government. The governments reacted to a new reality in which 
the fairly decent pay for qualified and experienced senior administrative and professional 
staffs in the civil service was lagging behind pay levels for comparable staffs in the 
private sector with no prospect of the gap being closed in the short to the medium term. 
The Botswana experience is discussed in more details in Chapter 4.  
 
The second group comprises countries that experienced a decline of their PA system but 
were seriously committed to rehabilitating their civil service systems by the early 1990s. 
They also embraced the democratization wave of the period but with significantly 
varying speed towards the establishment of democratic institutions and respect for the 
rule of law. Benin, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Malawi, Mauritania, 
Senegal, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia belong to this category of countries. 
Because of the strong commitment to reform in these countries, both bilateral and 
multilateral donor agencies accepted to provide assistance. However, this external 
support came with what amounted to an imposed sequencing in civil service 
rehabilitation. Without exception, all the countries were adversely affected by the 
economic decline that was in varying degrees of intensity in the 1970s and 1980s. In this 
circumstance, they agreed with their external helpers to adopt and implement structural 
adjustment programs that required reducing the burden of civil service wage bill on the 
budget. This was an explicit condition for financial support from the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank – and the support of these institutions was almost 
always a precondition for access to support from the other donors. In practical terms, 
attention was focused on civil service staff reduction, freezing of new recruitments, and 
removal of “ghost workers” with a view to reducing the size of the civil service wage bill. 
Only modest results were achieved: some retrenched workers returned through revolving 
doors; some new appointments had to be made to some essential services (notably in the 
social sector); and in most cases the largest numbers of retrenched staff were from the 
lower pay levels, yielding only small savings. 
 
While none of these countries has successfully rehabilitated its civil service system by 
2004, several have implemented selected reforms that have resulted in varying degrees of 
improvement in the functioning of the civil service systems. The reform efforts are of two 
types. First there are some selective and targeted reform measures such as the enclaving 
of tax administration, contracting of appointments of chief executives of MDAs, creation 
of executive agencies out of the central government’s MDAs, and salary enhancement for 
some groups in the senior civil service. The second type of reforms seeks to cover the 
entire civil service and they are focused on performance and referred to variously as 
improving performance through citizens’ or customers’ charters, and civil service 
improvement programs. Enclaving has meant the transfer of this function from the civil   8 
 
 
service to new structures (called Tax Administration or Revenue Authorities) run at arms-
length from the service and enjoying significant autonomy in staff recruitment and 
compensation, linked to a clearly articulated performance regime. In Kenya, tax revenues 
as percentage of GDP has been consistently over 25 percent since the revenue authority 
was created, compared to an average of about 16 percent in the majority of SSA 
countries. Results in some other countries that have adopted the approach have not 
produced similar outstanding results (Zambia and Uganda). (South Africa, a Group A 
country, has included an independent revenue authority in its package of civil service 
reforms and the results have also been outstanding). Another targeted improvement 
measure is the adoption, in the late 1990s, of NPM-style contract appointments (with pay 
levels fairly competitive with those in the private sector) for the chief administrative 
heads of ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs) of the central government. 
Because of poor performing economies and/or limited national resources (Ghana, Kenya, 
Malawi and Uganda) civil service salary scales, especially at the senior staff levels, are 
only a small fraction of the pay levels in the other sectors and the prospects for significant 
improvement in the short to medium term are poor.  
 
The creation of executive agencies is also NPM-inspired and involves the separation of 
service delivery functions from policy management. While the policy function remains 
with central government ministries and departments, executive agencies have 
responsibilities for discreet service delivery or development programs for which they are 
accountable for results. The staffs in both groups are regarded as civil servants but there 
is more flexibility in the staffing of the executive agencies than in the ministries, and the 
accountability and performance regimes differ in some important respects. For example, 
the flexibility regarding staffing includes the right to hire and fire. Although Ghana was 
the first SSA country to create an executive agency in 1994, Tanzania has gone furthest 
with 12 executive agencies by 2001 and fifty more in the pipeline. By 2001, the results 
were judged to have impacted positively on service delivery: “better roads maintenance, 
higher quality airport services, faster business registration and improved counter services 
and a more efficient and effective National Statistics Office.”
3 Regarding selective salary 
enhancement, called selective accelerated enhancement (SASE) scheme, the idea is that 
salaries of key technical and professional staff are to be raised to compete with those of 
the private sector. According to Stevens and Teggermann (2004), only Tanzania was 
implementing the SASE scheme by 2003 and it is receiving donor support in financing 
the significant salary increases involved. Donor support is provided over a five-year 
period during which Tanzania would progressively assume full responsibility for the 
scheme, pending the time that a competitive salary regime can be introduced for the 
entire civil service.  
 
All the reform measures aimed at achieving civil service-wide improvements are 
traceable, in varying degrees, to NPM influence. The idea of citizens’ charter was 
launched in 2001 as an African-wide initiative through the collaboration of the Centre 
africain de recherches en administration et developpement (CAFRAD) – African Centre 
for Research in Administration and Development - and the Government of the Republic 
                                                 
3 Tanzania Government’s Public Service Reform Annual Report, 2000/2001; cited in Mutahaba and Kiragu 
(2002; p. 65).     9 
 
 
of Namibia at a Pan-African Conference of the Ministers of Civil Service held in 
Windhoek, Namibia.
4 While Namibia has created an Efficiency and Charter Unit (ECU) 
in the Office of the Prime Minister, dedicated to promoting the introduction and 
implementation of charters by MDAs, less than one-third of the MDAs have launched 
their charters by mid-2003, and it was then too early to assess their impact. No other 
African country appears to have taken the idea seriously, though South Africa’s Batho 
Pele, a People First initiative (that was introduced in 1997) is in the tradition of citizens’ 
charters and is reported to be having positive impact on service delivery (Cameron, 
2004). In the early 1990s, Ghana launched a Civil Service Performance Improvement 
Program that was assessed in 2003 to have been largely unsuccessful in improving 
service delivery (Mutahaba and Kiragu, 2002:73).  
 
Countries in Group C have introduced some of the reform initiatives reviewed in respect 
of countries in Group B but none of them has recorded any success that is as noteworthy 
as those of Group B countries. In Chapter 4, Togo’s experience is provided as an 
illustration of “hesitant reformers”. Each of the beginners or non-starters that constitute 
Group D (at the opposite end of Group A countries) appears to have been caught up in a 
vicious cycle of unending conflicts (civil strife or civil wars), poor economies, and failed 
or failing states, with decaying PAs. It is noteworthy that Sierra Leone that “progressed” 
from non-starter status to a beginner a few years ago has identified the enclaving of 
revenue administration (through the establishment of a national revenue authority) as an 
“entry point” to public management reform. (See also the reference to Sierra Leone in the 
section on “Public Management Reforms at the Subnational Government Level” below). 
 
2.2.b. Public Enterprise Reforms  
Besides the civil service, the other public organizations that are part of the central 
government and which have been affected by public management reform efforts are the 
public enterprises (PEs), also referred to as state-owned enterprises (SOEs) or 
parastatals.
5 As already mentioned above in the section on the economic context, the 
redefinition of the role of the state and the accompanying shift from state-led growth to 
an embrace of market economy (including a further shift to private sector-led growth in 
some cases) has meant the privatization of many erstwhile PEs. By 2004, a review of 
public enterprise sector in SSA, see Chapter 10 of World Bank (2004) asserted that its 
size and importance had diminished significantly and privatization programs were 
described as advancing to maturity. Privatization transactions are cases where 
governments have: 
                                                 
4 A model “Charter for the Public Service in Africa” was adopted and individual countries were expected to 
adapt it for use. The charter has four basic principles: (i) principle of equality of treatment; (ii) principle of 
neutrality; (iii) principle of legality; and (iv) principle of continuity [in the provision of public service]. 
5 The term "parastatal" is used in a broader sense than PE to refer to all government-sponsored bodies that 
are outside the framework of the civil service. In addition to PEs, they include autonomous or independent 
agencies, advisory governmental bodies and administrative tribunals. They are sometimes considered as 
part of the public service in the broadest sense. In France and francophone Africa, the term ‘fonction 
publique’ is used to refer to this broader definition and it is commonly translated as the synonym of both 
civil service and public service. The French-inspired usage is also common in continental European 
countries and some other countries in Asia and Latin America. PE is used in this paper as synonymous with 
parastatal.   10 
 
 
a)   fully sold wholly – or majority-owned enterprises, 
b) sold shares and transferred ownership control but retained a minority equity 
interest, 
c)   sold shares but retained ownership control, 
d)  sold a proportion of a minority stake, and 
e)   conducted other transactions where management control has been ceded. 
 
What is being assessed is the extent of a government’s willingness to exit from 
commercial activities. Some of such enterprises would have constituted a burden on the 
budget through payment of subsidies while others are activities that private economic 
operators would perform better. In both cases, the objective is to free states from these 
commercial activities in order to better focus on their core functions. By 2002, the 
majority of SSA countries have been involved in privatization transactions. However, 
there are significant variations in the total share transactions and total asset sales and 
liquidation. While many countries have moved vigorously with privatization in the last 
five to six years there are still a few countries where the leadership remains wedded to 
public ownership (for example, Namibia). Countries that have moved vigorously with 
privatization include Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, 
Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. Notable positive results from privatization have been 
recorded in the telecommunication sector (for example, South Africa and several 
francophone countries) and in air transportation (for example, Kenya and Tanzania). 
 
PEs that are not privatized are either commercialized or restructured with a view to 
improving their performance. Commercialization involves reforms that aim at making 
PEs more efficient. There is partial commercialization as well as full commercialization. 
Fully commercialized PEs are expected to become entirely self-sufficient, with capacity 
to contribute a proportion of its profits to the state treasury. They are supposed to raise 
their capital and operating expenses from the capital markets. Partly commercialized PEs 
are expected at least to cover their operating costs. However, where the operations of a 
partly commercialized enterprise require a high level of capital investment, the 
government might have to intervene. In many cases, commercialization involves the 
change of the relationship between the management of the PE and the government 
through performance contracts or management contracts. A commonly cited example of 
successful commercialization is the case of Ethiopian Airlines. The restructuring of PEs 
that remain in the public domain and are not commercialized most often involve the 
introduction of reform measures that include greater clarity in the definition of PEs’ 
objectives, increased managerial autonomy and signed explicit performance agreements, 
introduction of new oversight bodies, and an emphasis on profitability.  
 
2.3  Public Management Reforms at the Subnational Government Level 
 
The two key terms in the discussion of public management reforms at the subnational 
level are decentralization and devolution. Definitional clarification covering these two 
terms and other related terms are provided in Box 1. 
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Box 1: Definitions of Decentralization, Devolution, and Other Related Terms 
The concept of decentralization has several uses when employed in the context of a public 
administration system. First, it can be used to refer to an administrative measure involving the 
transfer of management responsibilities and resources to agents of the central government located 
outside the headquarters at one or more levels (province, region, division, and district). This 
administrative decentralization is commonly referred to as deconcentration, and the field offices 
of the central government established in the process of deconcentration are also referred to as the 
field administration. Second, the term decentralization is used to refer to a political arrangement 
involving the devolution of specific powers, functions, and resources by the central government 
to subnational level government units. Subnational governments include regional, state, or 
provincial governments and local governments or municipalities. In many cases these subnational 
government units are substantially independent of the central government and have a legal status 
(personality). Normally the existence of provincial, regional or state governments is enshrined in 
constitutions in federal and quasi-federal states (for example, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and South 
Africa). There are examples of both federal and unitary states that formally provide for the 
establishment of local governments and municipalities in SSA and some countries provide for 
them in their constitutions (for example, Ethiopia, Nigeria and South Africa). Third, 
decentralization is used to refer to the delegation of authority and managerial responsibility for 
specific functions to organizations outside the central government structure. The organizations 
and agencies enjoy varying degrees of autonomy. All public organizations under the umbrella 
term, parastatals (as defined in the preceding section) are often cited as examples of this type of 
delegation. Specific examples include management boards of schools and hospitals. Finally, the 
term is also used to refer specifically to the transfer of responsibility for budgets and financial 
decisions from higher to lower levels of government. This is called fiscal decentralization, which 
is at the heart of the relationship between the central government and the subnational government 
units – commonly referred to as intergovernmental relations. 
Source: Adapted from Adamolekun (1999).  
 
The demand for political participation, which became a major feature of the 
worldwide wave of democratization of the early 1990s, was usually a call for the 
devolution of powers by central governments to self-governing communities at the 
regional or local level. By the late 1990s, decentralization policies had been adopted in 
about one hundred countries worldwide, including many countries in SSA. In all the 
countries that adopted decentralization, the arguments for it outweighed those against it 
and foremost among them is the expectation that subnational governments would be less 
remote from the local population and more accountable for their actions. In SSA 
countries that have adopted decentralization policies, there are broad similarities in the 
justifications that are highlighted and they are both political and economic: increased 
political participation and enhanced accountability combined with local revenue 
mobilization and more equitable resource allocation and utilization. Regarding the 
“dangers” of decentralization, the point that is made in some countries is that autonomy 
for distinct communities could weaken the state. It is in respect of implementation that 
there are important differences. Broadly, the Anglophone countries have moved faster in 
implementing decentralization policies than the Francophone countries.
6 The progress of 
implementing decentralization in Ghana, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda is far 
                                                 
6 This difference is a carry over from the former colonial rulers: Britain’s decentralized “indirect rule” 
system in Africa and the extension of France’s centralized national administration to its colonies in Africa.   12 
 
 
superior to the slow progress in Benin and Senegal. And there are more Francophone 
countries that have only decentralized in theory than is the case with Anglophone 
countries. Togo is an example of hesitant decentralization implementation. It is 
noteworthy that Sierra Leone, a “beginner” in public management reform, has identified 
decentralization, including elected local governments, as an “entry point” to public 
management reform; local government elections were held in the country in July 2004 
and the on-going implementation of a decentralization project is supported by a World 
Bank credit. 
 
By the end of 2003, there were elected local governments or municipal governments in 
many SSA countries, including Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ethiopia, 
Ghana, Madagascar, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, 
and Zimbabwe. In some of these countries, the tradition of self-governing local 
governments predated the new wave of democratization of the early 1990s but in a 
majority of countries, local governments were extensions of central governments and 
instruments of control under one party or military regimes (for example, Benin, Ethiopia, 
Guinea, Togo, and Zambia).
7 The development performance of local and municipal 
governments in SSA countries (resource mobilization and utilization and efficient service 
delivery) is usually affected by financial and human resources available to them. The 
tendency in many SSA countries is for central governments to assign or transfer functions 
to local governments without due regard to the financial and human resources required to 
carry them out. Nigeria has a constitutional arrangement that provides for the allocation 
of a fixed proportion of national revenue to local governments to perform functions that 
are clearly spelled out in the country’s constitution. In practice, the discretion of the local 
governments to use the funds is constrained by spending decisions imposed by state and 
federal governments. Another factor that has affected the functioning of local 
governments in some countries is the challenge of accommodating traditional chiefs who 
remain influential, especially in rural areas. (In a few countries such as Botswana and 
Senegal, there is also a need for accommodating them at the national level).  
 
An example of good practice in respect of fiscal decentralization is provided in Box 2. On 
a broader level, the commonly cited examples of good practice in achieving improved 
development performance through elected subnational governments in SSA are Ghana 
and Uganda.  
 
Two other important issues that have been addressed, in varying degrees, in public 
management reforms in SSA countries, cover two or all three of the distinct areas 
discussed above. First, budget reform and the broader issue of public financial 
management improvement in both central and subnational governments. Second, 
combating corruption, another worldwide phenomenon of the 1990s, covers all three 
areas: central governments, public enterprises and subnational governments. 
 
                                                 
7 With the exception of Botswana that has maintained elected local governments without interruption since 
independence, elected local governments have appeared and disappeared at intervals in some Anglophone 




Box 2: Limited Fiscal Decentralization Yields Results in Kenya 
In Kenya, where a clear-cut decentralization policy is not yet in place, the public service reform 
program has a component of local government reform that reflects the need for institutional 
pluralism in service delivery. In this context, Government has introduced a Local Authority 
Transfer Fund to which it disburses 5 percent of all its revenues to the local government councils. 
However, the release of funds to a council is tied to the submission of service delivery 
improvement plans, and a plan to achieve a 5 percent reduction in spending on staff each 
successive year in the medium term. This simple fiscal decentralization measure appears to be 
effective. Accountability by the councils has vastly improved, with 100 percent return of 
proposals and accounts. There is also ample anecdotal evidence of significant improvements in 
service delivery in many local government councils. 
Source: Mutahaba and Kiragu (2002:61), with minor editorial changes by the author. 
 
 
2.4  Budget Reform and Public Financial Management:  
 
Budget management (that is, the mobilization, allocation and utilization of resources) is 
at the core of public sector management. Its key objectives have been summarized as 
follows: (i) proper planning and budgeting for public expenditures; (ii) effective and 
efficient administration of government revenues; (iii) proper use of budget resources; (iv) 
effective control of public expenditure; (v) accounting and reporting on public finance; 
and (vi) full accountability for all public spending; see Kiragu (1999). A good handle on 
the subject is provided by the use of a medium term expenditure framework (MTEF) for 
ensuring effective linking of policy, planning and the budget. A well-designed MTEF that 
is faithfully implemented is normally characterized by sound development policies and 
the delivery of quality services to the public. However, before a country introduces a 
MTEF, there is need to get the basics of budgeting right. Schick (1998) has highlighted 
the following “basics”: a realistic budget that is faithfully implemented; high 
transparency in public finance; public funds spent for authorized public purposes; 
reported expenditure corresponds to actual expenditure; reliable external and/or internal 
controls; and spending units have reasonable certainty as to the funds that will be 
available. 
 
Against this backdrop, public financial management reform efforts in most SSA countries 
with poor budgetary processes – as part of the decline of the PA system highlighted in 
Chapter 1 - have sought to combine getting the basics right with the introduction of 
MTEF. Predictably, this has proved difficult to achieve. Of 19 SSA countries that have 
adopted the MTEF process during the last decade, only about five have successfully 
integrated it with their budget processes (Namibia, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, and 
Uganda). Many of the other countries are only piloting an MTEF. In reality, this means 
that the process is unlikely to have a beneficial effect on the budget process. In the 
countries with functioning MTEF processes, a key feature is the involvement of key 
stakeholders in the budget process in its preparation. The stakeholders include cabinet 
members, parliamentarians and civil society. South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda are 
arguable the leaders; see Garnett and Plowden (2004) for the good practice of the MTEF   14 
 
 
process in South Africa. The obvious lesson from existing experiences is a 
reconfirmation of the counsel that getting the basics of budget right should precede the 
introduction of an MTEF that should be government-wide when the relevant prior 
conditions are met. MTEF piloting that started in Malawi in 1994 is yet to be integrated 
with the budget process.  
 
Almost at the same time as MTEF was being introduced, many countries, in partnership 
with some donors (with the World Bank as lead agency) began to implement two 
initiatives aimed at improving two critical aspects of public financial management: one is 
focused on procurement reform and the other is focused on financial accountability. The 
diagnostic tool used for the former is called a country procurement assessment report 
(CPAR) while the diagnostic toll used for the former is called a country financial 
accountability assessment (CFAA). One of the main points raised in CFAAs is the 
widespread inadequacy of qualified accounting staff. This is the major explanatory factor 
for the small number of accounting staff in public services (those that are available prefer 
the “greener pastures” of the private sector), resulting in delayed audits. This means that 
technical auditing is usually delayed in such countries and there are no prospects of 
moving towards value for money auditing. However, there are a few exceptions (for 
example, Botswana, Kenya, and South Africa). And Botswana has moved further to 
introduce and implement accrual accounting – a practice that is at the cutting edge of 
accounting practice (see Box 3). 
 
 
Box 3: Accrual Accounting in Botswana 
Government accounting is maintained on a cash basis plus a system of modified cash and 
accruals for special funds and trading accounts. The data for the computerized system, which was 
first introduced in 1977, is processed in batches and budgets, accounts (sic.). There are 27 local 
council authorities in Botswana: 6 urban councils, 9 district councils and 12 land boards. All 
councils are required to produce annual accounts within three months of the year-end and to have 
them audited by an auditor appointed by the Office of the Auditor-General. Accrual basis of 
accounting is used and the training of professional accountants is provided by the Botswana 
Accountancy College (BAC). BAC is a private sector college largely subsidized by the Botswana 
Government and the Debswana Diamond Company. There appears to be a strong recognition by 
Government of the importance of establishing a supply of qualified and trained accountants for 
the public and private sectors. 
Source: East and Southern Association of Accountants General (ESAAG), cited in ECA (2004b: 
21). 
 
In the CFAAs that have been completed the reform measures that are usually 
recommended focus on the improvement of systems and procedures with emphasis on the 
prevention of fraud, waste and mismanagement. Although the technical quality of these 
assessments is high, the pace of implementation and the extent to which they enhance 
financial accountability is yet to be systematically carried out. In the meantime, donors 
who have started pilot testing “budget support” (providing funds for donor-supported 
development programs and projects directly through the budgets of recipient countries) 
appear to be more or less satisfied once a country has conducted a CFAA and accepts to   15 
 
 
implement its recommendations. Regarding CPARs, the important point to emphasize is 
the fact that over 60 percent of the average SSA country’s public spending (at both the 
national and subnational levels) involve procurement. Again, the CPARs are usually of 
high technical quality, covering all the issues of transparency, competition and regular 
public reporting. Implementation in most countries leaves much to be desired. In 
countries we have described as “hesitant reformers”, it is a case of long delays or total 
inaction until donors decide to undertake another round of CPARs, according to so-called 
timetables agreed with the governments. Of course, this is nonsense. Even in the 
countries described as “committed reformers”, implementation of procurement reforms is 
largely hesitant. The poor implementation of procurement reforms in so many countries 
is almost certainly linked to the problem of corruption that the countries are not yet ready 
to seriously combat.  
 
2.5 Combating  Corruption 
 
Combating corruption is another worldwide phenomenon of the 1990s that has also 
featured prominently in the public management reform efforts in most SSA countries. 
From the extensive literature
8 on the subject during the last dozen years or so when 
research and writing on it emerged as a “growth industry”, two perspectives are of 
particular relevance to the SSA region. One is the universal nature of the problem of 
corruption: it exists under all regime types, in old and new democracies, in all cultures, in 
the public, private and voluntary sectors, and it impacts negatively on both individuals 
and states, though with differing intensity. It appears that it is corruption as greed, linked 
to varying degrees of moral deficit, that is part of the nature of some humans wherever 
they live and work and regardless of their levels of comfort and wealth that typifies this 
universal dimension to the problem. The second perspective is contextual or 
particularistic: there are specific manifestations and consequences that relate to individual 
countries, sub-cultural groups (for example, there are sub-cultural groups in Cameroon, 
Kenya and Nigeria), cultural or racial groups (Africans, Asians, British, Italians, French 
or Whites and Blacks in the USA and South Africa), and economic divisions (rich or 
poor). Significantly the anti-corruption movement that gathered momentum in the early 
1990s began in Europe, with Italy as a leader. It quickly spread to other European 
countries and then, to all continents. While the focus in most of these “Northern” 
countries was largely on moral “cleansing” of their societies and ensuring social justice, 
the focus in a majority of the literature focused on “Southern” countries and transition 
economies was essentially on how corruption undermined socioeconomic development, 
thereby rendering ineffective the development assistance provided by governments of 
“Northern” governments (henceforth referred to as OECD countries). Very quickly, all 
donors (multilateral and bilateral) introduced combating corruption as a condition for 
their development assistance.  
 
Regarding SSA countries (as well as other developing countries) that depend, in varying 
degrees, on financial assistance from donors, adoption and implementation of anti-
corruption programs became a condition for donor assistance. (It does not really matter if 
                                                 
8 An overview of the problem of corruption, including assessments of anti-corruption efforts to date in 28 
SSA countries is provided in Economic Commission for Africa (2004c).   16 
 
 
some donors claim that they are only “helping” countries to fight corruption). In these 
circumstances, earlier endogenous anti-corruption efforts to combat corruption for both 
economic and moral reasons in several SSA countries (for example, Tanzania in the 
1960s and Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone in the 1970s) were rarely mentioned. 
Notwithstanding the external pressure (also referred to as a “political conditionality”), the 
quality of anti-corruption programs, and more importantly, the progress of 
implementation in SSA countries has depended more on the extent of internal pressure to 
combat the problem than on the impact of external pressure. There are three main reasons 
for the concern of donors with the problem of corruption. First, because combating 
corruption was a topical issue in some of the donor countries, they naturally made it an 
issue in the context of their relationships with countries for which they were providing 
development assistance. Second, because of the strong evidence that corruption 
undermines the effectiveness of development assistance because it impacts negatively on 
economic growth and distorts public spending and worsens the problems of the poor (see 
Box 4), both the governments and their domestic constituencies supported the idea of 
making anti-corruption a condition for the flow of development assistance.
9 Anti-
corruption as a political conditionality for developing countries (including SSA countries) 
was also consistent with what had been adopted for EU candidate member states since the 
late 1990s. A third reason was the concern of OECD countries with eradication of bribery 
in international business relations (usually linked to competition for contracts) between 
multilateral companies and public officials in developing countries through the adoption 
of a convention in 1997.  
 
 
Box 4. Some Consequences of Corruption 
•  Distorts the composition of government expenditure.  
•  Reduces expenditure on operations and maintenance. 
•  Lowers the quality of public infrastructure and services. 
•  Reduces government revenues. 
•  Lowers incentives to private investment.  
•  Undermines legitimacy and credibility of the state.  
•  Influences outcomes of the legal and regulatory processes. 
•  Violates the social and economic rights of the poor and the vulnerable. 
•  Erodes the moral fabric of society. 
  
 
It was against this backdrop that combating corruption emerged as a prominent issue in 
public management reform programs in many SSA countries that depended on donor 
assistance to finance varying proportions of their development programs and projects. 
The anti-corruption measures implemented within public management reform programs 
are of two main types: some are focused on the improvement of financial accountability, 
                                                 
9 Corroborative evidence is also provided in the fact that in the case of SSA countries, the six countries in 
the bottom 25 percent of the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) produced by Transparency International 
(an international anti-corruption non-governmental organization) for 1999 were also in the bottom 25 
percent of the Human Development Index (of the UNDP). More or less the same finding was repeated for 
2000 through 2004.   17 
 
 
including procurement reform, and others are focused on the work of anti-corruption 
bodies that enjoy varying degrees of autonomy (for example, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, 
Malawi, Nigeria, Zambia and Zimbabwe). The specific measures relating to financial 
accountability and procurement have already been discussed in the preceding section. 
There is broad agreement in the assessments of performance of anti-corruption bodies in 
SSA on three factors of good or poor performance: the degree of autonomy of the bodies, 
the resources (human, financial and material) made available to them, and the ability of 
the bodies to forge strategic alliances with groups in the public, private and voluntary 
sectors with a view to enhancing their effectiveness.  
 
Four major problem areas are highlighted in these assessments. First there is the problem 
of salary erosion in the civil service (including the police) that results in many civil 
servants in the junior and intermediate levels earning less than “living wages”. The 
majority of cases of what is called “petty corruption” (arising from “need”) is traced to 
this problem. Unfortunately, because of the persistence poor performance of the 
economies in most of these countries, the efforts made to tackle the problem to date have 
not been effective. The second problem area relates to the corruption at the level of 
higher civil servants, most often in collusion with politicians, and sometimes it is a 
tripartite collusion with businessmen/women as the third parties. These corrupt practices 
are usually related to contract awards. (A varying proportion of corrupt practices at the 
level of higher civil servants could also be said to arise from “need” partly because of the 
compression of salaries and partly because of uncertainty over security of tenure at these 
levels). The third problem area is the straightforward looting of government treasuries 
that is dominated by politicians, sometimes involving higher civil servants in some 
countries (for example, Nigeria). Fourth and finally, there is the international dimension 
in the form of public officials who stash away the proceeds of their corrupt practices in 
foreign countries – as deposits in banks and/or as property investments. There are no 
examples of success stories in these areas to date and promises by the countries where 
looted funds are lodged or “invested” to repatriate the funds have only been honored in a 
very few cases. Overall, the anti-corruption fight remains daunting in most SSA 
countries. Paradoxically, though not surprisingly, it is in countries with low levels of 
corrupt practices that anti-corruption efforts have recorded significant results. Again, 
Botswana is the commonly cited example: “[The anti-corruption agency] has produced 
some successful outcomes in its role of complementing the state institutions established 
to improve governance and deepen accountability and transparency in the country.”
10 
This is another confirmation of the virtuous cycle hypothesis.  
 
 
Chapter 3: The Politics and Administration Nexus in the Conduct of 
Government Business 
 
The politics and administration nexus in the conduct of government business is a special 
focus in public administration literature, for example Adamolekun (1983 and 2002), on 
which some of this discussion here is drawn. The politics and administration nexus 
                                                 
10 Kpundeh (2004: 269).   18 
 
 
determines, to a great extent, the quality of a public administration system, simply 
because leadership matters. Strong leadership at the top of the machinery of government, 
provided jointly by the political leadership team and the leadership of the career civil 
service is essential for both policy formulation and implementation which sum up what 
governmental administration is about. Diagram 2 provides a graphical representation of a 
conceptual framework that summarizes the respective roles of politicians and 
administrators in the conduct of government business.  
 
Diagram 2:  The Respective Roles of Politicians and Administrators in the Conduct 















The basic assumption of this framework is that there exists a distinction between the 
political judgment content and the technical expertise content of major issues with which 
politicians and administrators deal. It is postulated (a) that politicians dominate the issues 
which have a high content of political judgment and a low content of technical expertise 
(e.g. decentralization policy); (b) that administrators dominate the issues with a high 
content of technical expertise and a low content of political judgment (e.g. science and 
technology policy); (c) and that in regard to issues with both a high content of political 
judgment and technical expertise, politicians and administrators take decisions by 
cooperative effort, as partners in a joint enterprise (e.g. the budget process). Each 
postulate is represented in the diagram. Although the above illustrations relate to policy 
formulation, they can be extended to policy implementation. The implementation stage of 
the policy process can be described as highly technical, with little room for political 
judgment (notwithstanding the intrusion of political considerations), until the monitoring 
and evaluation stage when politicians in both the executive and legislative arms of 
government do become involved. This point confirms the salience of the cyclical nature 
of the policy process: ideas about new directions for existing policies or totally new 
policies could emerge at the implementation and evaluation/monitoring stages; see 
Diagram 3. 
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Note to Diagram 3:  The policy cycle begins at the policy formulation or policy-
making stage; continues to the implementation and evaluation / monitoring stages; 
and then returns to the formulation stage. 
 
 
Although SSA countries inherited politics-administration relationships that reflected, in 
varying degrees, the features of the framework summarized in Diagram 2, the dominant 
trend in most countries before the public management reforms of the 1990s was the 
progressive politicization of administration and the bureaucratization of politics. The 
same trend was noticeable in all the regime types that emerged in the majority of SSA 
countries from the late 1960s to the advent of the new wave of democratization of the 
early 1990s. The differences in politics-administration relationships were essentially in 
the details, depending on whether it was a one-party state regime (for example Guinea 
and Tanzania), a military regime (for example, Benin and Nigeria), or a state that 
maintained a façade of constitutionalism (for example, Senegal). In almost every case, 
there was failure to nurture technical competence and bureaucratic domination of the 
policy process resulted in weakness in both policy formulation and implementation. 
There were only a few examples where politics-administration relationships 
approximated our framework (for example, Botswana and Mauritius).  
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One aspect of the politics-administration relationship problem that has been addressed in 
many of the public sector reform programs in SSA countries is how to assure a quality 
administrative leadership that is also loyal to an incumbent political leadership team. This 
is linked to a broader issue of how best to separate political from career appointments. 
There is need to acknowledge and accept that under a democratic order where political 
executive teams could change after periodic elections, newly elected leadership team 
members would want to appoint a few staff whose loyalty includes personal confidence 
and who are totally committed to the achievement of their programs. This category of 
public officials constitute a distinct group within the leadership of governmental 
administration in many of the old democracies: they are known variously as special 
advisers in the United Kingdom, political administrators in Germany, political appointees 
in the USA and members of Ministerial Cabinets in France. They are responsible for 
policy advocacy and are not bound by the norms of anonymity and political neutrality. 
They are able to speak out in public in defense of policies being pursued by the political 
leadership. This enhances open and accountable government: those responsible for 
government policies can be identified and named for praise or blame.
11  
 
In the SSA contexts, it would be sensible to specify the number of such appointments and 
prescribe some minimum technical professional qualifications. A good practice is the 
arrangement in South Africa that allows each minister to have two or three special 
advisers with a slightly larger number for the president and his deputy. In the 
Francophone African countries, they constitute the Ministerial Cabinets.
12 In all cases, the 
tenure of political appointees should be coterminous with that of the appointing political 
executive. What is required in every case is total transparency in all matters relating to 
political appointees: their qualifications, job descriptions and remuneration packages. The 
relevant information should be widely published in the media. When a career official 
accepts to perform the functions of a political appointee, it would be necessary to state 
under what conditions the official could return to the career service. In the case of a 
political appointee who seeks a career or contract position at the end of his/her tenure, it 
would be reasonable to require the official to go through the prevailing competitive 
procedures for recruitment to the career or contract position. The suggestions proffered 
here are summarized in Box 5.  
 
 
                                                 
11 Of course, career higher civil servants would also contribute to policy advice as already pointed out in 
the section on “political context”. The career higher civil servants have, as their primary responsibility, the 
leadership of the programmatic activities of their ministries, departments and agencies. They would also be 
responsible for providing leadership for the civil service as an institution. However, in countries that have 
adopted the executive agency arrangement, the smaller number of higher civil servants in MDAs would 
focus on regulatory management and the management of the contracts for the agencies, especially the 
monitoring and evaluation of performance  
12 The establishment of Ministerial Cabinets in Francophone African countries is an imitation of an 
institution by the same name in France. Although the emphasis is on the political responsiveness of 
members of French Ministerial Cabinets, they are mostly drawn from the higher civil service, which also 
happens to produce the majority of Cabinet Ministers most of the time. In the Francophone African 
countries, partisan political considerations predominate, and this means a loss in technical and professional 
competence in many cases.   21 
 
 
Box 5: Proposed Composition of Staff in the Civil Service in SSA 
A. Political  Appointees   
Temporary tenure, coterminous with that of the appointing political executive. Key criteria for 
selection are loyalty and policy compatibility. Minimum professional qualifications to be 
specified for different types. Number must be small at all times. 
B. Contract  Appointments   
Transitional arrangement to be phased out as an element of strategy as “C” below becomes 
adequately strong. Total number of top managers and top-notch professionals to be appointed on 
contracts to be determined by the needs of each country, especially the initial capacity condition 
at level “C”. (The occasional contract appointments that are found in most state bureaucracies 
would remain a permanent feature in the SSA countries). 
C.  Small but Strong Career Civil Service 
Could have a small corps of senior executives – a Senior Executive Service (SES). Rest of the 
career civil service to be recruited on merit with appropriate measures introduced to ensure some 
degree of representativeness – notably race, gender and ethnicity. Overall size would vary from 
one country to another. Civil Service Commissions whose independence is enshrined in national 
constitutions would be needed to provide overall direction for the career civil service, including 
the protection of the merit system. If necessary, there should also be provision for judicial 
protection of the security of tenure of career officials. 
D. Non-Career  Officials 
Messengers, cleaners, lift attendants, food caterers and so on should not be included in the career 
service. They should be hired under the prevailing labor market laws. And their pay, allowances 
and separation terms would be in accordance with these laws.  
  
 As shown in Box 5, the group of officials next to the political appointees, that is, the 
chief administrative heads of MDAs, can be appointed on contract. Such contract 
appointments are already the practice in some SSA countries, including Botswana, 
Ghana, Malawi, South Africa and Uganda. The salary factor in contract appointments at 
this level has already been mentioned. Another factor that has been invoked, in varying 
degrees in all cases, is the need to open the most senior civil service positions to talents 
from both within and outside the service. Although not explicitly acknowledged, the 
incumbent political team would like this category of officials to be loyal to them. In 
particular, they would like them to be sympathetic to their policy thrusts and priorities 
without the concern for partisan loyalty they require of political appointees.  
 
While all these justifications for the use of contract appointments at the immediate level 
below political appointees are sensible, it must be acknowledged that it is a temporary 
“solution” that would eventually be replaced by a more robust and sustainable 
arrangement that is integrated with the career system. To derive satisfactory results from 
the contract appointments, the procedures need to be transparent and competitive and 
there should be credible arrangements for monitoring and evaluation. This is not likely to 
be an easy task because the limited information available on the working of contracts for 
senior managers in the public services of the few SSA countries that have adopted the 
reform measure highlights the following main problems: inadequate transparency in the 
contracting process; ineffective monitoring and evaluation of the performance of the 
hired managers and technical professionals (fear of political manipulation) and weak   22 
 
 
enforcement of the contracts in some cases.
13 It might be useful to fix most contract terms 
longer than each country’s political cycle with provisions for the removal of non-
performers whenever adequate evidence is available. The merit of the contract “solution” 
is that it would help ensure that the hired staff could be held responsible to deliver the 
results spelled out in their contracts. The results of a better performing civil service could 
produce additional resources that would enable government to progressively increase the 
pay levels of its career civil service staff. An interesting variation on the contract theme 
was the short-lived experiment of a team of national experts parachuted from outside to 
breathe new life into the lethargic civil service in Kenya in July 1999. The story is 
summarized in Box 6.  
 
Box 6: The Kenya Change Team Experiment (July 1999-March 2001) 
The “Change Team” (also referred to as the “Dream Team”) comprised six top rate Kenyan 
professionals drawn from the parastatal and private sectors inside Kenya and from international 
organizations in July 1999. They were recruited through a “search” procedure for a two-year stint 
on salaries and allowances equivalent to what they were earning at the time of the recruitment. 
The Government of Kenya also successfully arranged a re-entry guarantee for each member of 
the team. The team was specifically mandated to clean the civil service of its inefficiency and 
corruption and to develop and begin to implement an economic recovery program.  
By August 2000, the Change Team had succeeded in bringing about the resumption of 
development assistance to Kenya by the IMF, the World Bank and several other donors, notably 
the European Union and UK. This achievement was made possible by several improvements 
made by the Team in national economic management. By December 2000, the highlights of the 
Team’s achievements included the production of an Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-
PRSP); adoption and progressive implementation of transparent and competitive procurement 
reform measures; removal of poor performers from some key civil service and parastatal 
positions and their replacement with competent and honest professionals; strong support for the 
serious anticorruption measures of the Kenya Anticorruption Authority (KACA) that included the 
catching and prosecution of many corrupt public officials, including a few “big fishes”. 
However, the work of the Change Team came to an abrupt end in March 2001 when its leader 
and two other members were removed. One other top rate Kenyan professional recruited to join 
the team in June 2000 to serve as the privatization “czar” was also removed. Reports in 
newspapers in the immediate weeks after the dismantling of the Team suggests that some key 
persons in the incumbent regime had become uncomfortable with the overall thrust of the Change 
Team’s work, especially in respect of anticorruption and privatization. KACA was declared 
illegal in December 2000 and the privatization effort lost steam. The obvious question to pose is 
whether the experiment was worthwhile since the sustainability of the Team’s achievements is 
highly unlikely. 
Note: On immediate reactions to the demise of the “Change Team”, see, for example, Daily 
Nation (Nairobi) for March, April, May and June 2001. The newspaper’s archive can be found in 
the Internet: http://www.nationaudio.com.  
                                                 
13 Given the evidence that these contracting problems also exist, in varying degrees, in older states with 
stronger contract cultures, the learning curve for effective implementation of contracts could take many 
years in most SSA countries. It is noteworthy that some of these contracting problems were mentioned to a 
team of World Bank Public Sector Management Specialists (including the writer) who visited New Zealand 
in January/February 1997. New Zealand is widely acknowledged as the pioneer country that introduced 




The third group of officials involved in the politics-administration nexus relationships is 
the group of senior career civil servants. The failure of most SSA countries to fully re-
introduce merit-based recruitment in their civil services means that those who occupy the 
topmost positions in the career civil service are indistinguishable in many respects from 
the two groups of political appointees and chief administrative heads of MDAs. Some 
Anglophone countries (for example Kenya and Uganda), are considering the creation of 
an elite corps of higher civil servants, similar to the Senior Executive Service (SES) that 
was first established in the USA in 1978 and has already spread to several OECD 
countries (for example, Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom). In the 
francophone countries, a poor imitation of French-style ministerial cabinets (cabinets 
ministeriels) is the major cause of the muddle between political appointees and senior 
career civil servants. Normally, members of ministerial cabinets are temporary political 
appointees who are to assist the members of the political executive through the 
combination of their technical expertise and unconditional political loyalty. In a majority 
of the francophone countries, the political appointees are strong on the political loyalty 
criterion and weak on the technical competence criterion.
14 In some of the countries (e.g. 
Benin and Chad), the problem is exacerbated by a confused arrangement in which the 
political appointees also constitute the leadership group of the state administration. 
International experience shows clearly that the depth of political appointments in 
government ministries and departments is inversely related to public administration 
capability and performance (see Box 7).  
 
Box 7: Politicization and Public Administration Capacity (depth of political 
appointments) 
 
Philippines     Other East Asia   Francophone Africa 
Secretary    X  Minister   X  Minister X 
Under secretary  X  Level 2   X  Level 2 X 
Assistant secretary  X  Level 3   Y  Level 3 X 
Bureau director  X  Level 4   Y  Level 4 X 
Regional director  X   Y 
Service  director  X       Y 
Division chief   Y  Division Chief  Y  Division chief  Y   
 
Notes: 
1. X = Political appointments; Y = Administrative (career) appointments. 
2. Philippine’s public administration was ranked low compared to the moderate to high ranking 
for the other East Asian countries and the latter recorded better economic performance in the 
1990s than was the case in the former. The evidence in the Figure suggests that economic 
performance in Francophone African countries would be close to that of the Philippines.  
Source: Adapted from World Development Report 1997, p. 93 
                                                 
14 In some countries, some members of ministerial cabinets are treated as glorified household servants. 





It is important to stress that the ultimate objective of getting the political leadership team 
and the appointed officials (both permanent and temporary) to work well together is to 
ensure that the policy process, which is at the heart of their interactions, is managed in a 
manner that assures the formulation of sound policies as well as their faithful 
implementation, resulting in the delivery of desired goods and services to the public. 
Persistent underdevelopment in SSA region (the increase in the percentage of persons 
living in poverty by 2000 compared to 1990 is one strong evidence and another is the 
alert already raised that the region would be the laggard among developing countries in 
achieving the 2015 Millennium Development Goals) shows that the majority of these 
countries are experiencing serious problems in respect of their policy processes. By the 
logic of democratic politics, prescribing educational qualification for elected politicians 
has to be strictly limited, for example, exclusion of persons who cannot read or write in a 
country’s official language. However, given the explosion in knowledge and the advance 
in technology (especially information and communication technology), and the reality of 
globalization, there is a strong argument in favor of developing appropriate programs to 
raise the level of understanding of politicians in SSA countries (both in the executive and 
legislative branches). Failure to do this would result in a much wider ability gap between 
politicians and permanent officials, resulting in virtual domination of the policy process 
by the latter. One possible solution would be to expose political appointees and some 
political leaders to aspects of the managerial training and leadership development 
programs offered to top public managers and professionals. A summary of the contents of 
leadership development programs that could be adapted and integrated into the education 
and training programs for top managers and professionals in public services in SSA is 
provided in Table 2.  
 
 
Table 2: Executive Core Qualifications 










































   25 
 
 
Chapter 4: Some Country Experiences of Good and Bad Practices 
 
In addition to the brief references to good and bad practices provided in the discussion of 
selected public management reform experiences in the previous two Chapters Two and 
Three, four country experiences of good and bad practices are summarized below. They 
are in greater depth than those provided in the preceding two chapters and, at the end of 
each country experience, attention is drawn to a few lessons that reformers in other 
countries could learn from it. The first case pre-dates the independence of Nigeria from 
which it has been selected. It is included in a review of experiences of 1990-2004 because 
of its continued salience. Not only is there no similar experience in an area of crucial 
importance in the conduct of government business in SSA, the specific experience would 
compare favorably with any of its kind worldwide, then and now. It would probably 
qualify to be called a classic. The second country experience is how South Africa planned 
and implemented the initial stages of its public service reform program: a systematic and 
carefully planned approach that combined rigor in design with due regard to both the 
usefulness of a conceptual framework, including relevant constitutional, legal and 
legislative measures and the practical considerations that would promote successful 
implementation. The third example is the successful public management reform 
experience in Botswana from the immediate post-independence years to the present. The 
fourth country experience is the hesitant approach to civil service reform in Togo. While 
key stakeholders in the public sector as well as the private and voluntary sectors had clear 
ideas on priority actions that should feature in a public sector management reform 
program whose implementation is badly needed for the country’s socioeconomic 
development, there was only a half-hearted effort to design a reform program on the part 
of the leaders of the governmental administration. 
 
4.1  Nigeria: Successful Joint Leadership of Government Business, 1954-1959
15  
 
In his valedictory address to the Western Nigeria House of Assembly in 1959, the 
outgoing premier, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, made the following remarks about the civil 
service: 
Our civil service is exceedingly efficient, absolutely incorruptible in its upper stratum, 
and utterly devoted and unstinting in the discharge of its many onerous duties. For our 
civil servants, government workers and labourers to bear, uncomplainingly and without 
breaking down, the heavy and multifarious burdens with which we have in the interest of 
the public saddled them, is an epic of loyalty and devotion, of physical and mental 
endurance, and of a sense of mission, on their part. From the bottom of my heart I salute 
all of them. 
 
This is a most unusual praise by a political head of government for civil servants. 
Evidence that one can really talk of a successful partnership between politics and 
administration is provided by the reciprocal admiration of the leadership of the career 
civil service for the politicians with whom they worked between 1954 and 1959: 
                                                 
15 This is an extract (with slight modifications) from Adamolekun (1993: 59-63).   26 
 
 
When I served under Chief Awolowo in the West, he used to say that I should tell my 
colleagues that he could deal with the politics of the issues. What he wanted were 
detailed analyses of their implications. With the facts at his disposal, he felt that he would 
be in a better position to decide on what to do. This sums up my own view too about the 
relationship that should exist between ministers and civil servants. 
 
The “success story” upon which both the head of government and the head of the civil 
service were agreed consisted of two sets of actions. One set was related to administrative 
organization and management and the other concerned certain government policies for 
social and economic development that were adopted and implemented with varying 
degrees of success. Regarding administrative organization and management, the inherited 
colonial administration was transformed into one that became appropriate for a 
parliamentary system of government; its personnel was “Nigerianized”, and a functioning 
system of staff recruitment and training was established. The Nigerianized civil service 
was also of a high quality, with a carefully established legal and constitutional foundation 
consisting of a public administration law and a set of regulations prepared by a public 
service commission. All this earned the Western Nigeria civil service the enviable title of 
“first in Africa”, “a pacemaker and model for other civil services in Anglophone Africa”, 
and one that many observers regarded as matching that of Britain “in terms of formal 
organization and official working”. This was no mean achievement.  
 
In the sphere of social and economic development, the ruling party in the region was 
formally committed to a set of policies and programs, one of which was “free universal 
primary education for all children of school-going age”. At the time this policy was being 
prepared in 1954, an expatriate education officer in the civil service declared that the 
policy was “impossible in our own lifetime, absolutely impossible”. It was successfully 
launched in 1955. The determination of the political leadership that had mobilized the 
population in support of the program combined with the hard work of the majority of 
civil servants ensured the successful implementation of this visionary policy.  
 
This exemplary politics-administration relationship was short-lived; it did not survive the 
departure of both the political head of government and the head of the civil service. Both 
moved on to assume positions at the federal level. However, the solid civil service 
institution that they built survived the political crisis that began in the region in 1962, 
merging into the advent of military rule in the entire country in January 1966.
16 
Eventually, decline and decay set in during the decades-long bad governance imposed by 
successive military rulers. The onset of the decay and decline was probably around the 
mid-1970s.  
 
Lessons from the Western Nigeria “success story” 
1.  A political leader with a clear vision and a well articulated development strategy 
would tend to manage the politics-administration interface in a manner that enhances 
the chance of successful implementation of his development programs and projects, 
                                                 
16 On the survival of the high quality Western Nigerian civil service through the political crisis of 1962-65, 
see Murray (1970). 
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including such an ambitious one as a universal primary education program at a time 
the idea was virtually unknown in any developing country. 
2.  Mutual respect and trust between the top political leader and the head of the civil 
service helps to ensure provision of adequate resources for nurturing the civil service, 
including assurance of decent pay, security of tenure, staff development and training 
and skills upgrading - all contributing to produce a competent administration with a 
public service ethos and an esprit de corps.  
3.  The phenomenon of a visionary and development-oriented head of government and a 
strong and competent head of the civil service is not a chance event; it is the former 
who selects the latter and has the powers to fire him/her if he so desires. In other 
words, for a state that becomes a “beginner” in public management reform, either in a 
post-conflict situation or through a “window of opportunity” following an election, it 
is the quality of the head of government that would determine whether or not that 
country would proceed to move in the direction of a virtuous cycle.  
4.  The reversal that happened in Western Nigeria is a reminder that whatever the heights 
attained in the context of building a strong public administration system, it cannot 
survive political decay for too long. The experience underscores the strong link 
between governance environment and the quality of a public administration system. 
The evidence provided by the Western Nigeria story needs to be nuanced because the 
region was a part of a federation that had the misfortune of military rule for over three 
decades from 1966 onwards. In 2004, over 70 percent of Nigeria’s population lives 
below the poverty line compared with less than 20 percent in 1960. Would 
developments in Western Nigeria have evolved differently if it were an independent 
state? Perhaps.  
 
4.2  South Africa: Conceptualization and Initial Implementation of Public  
 Service  Reform
17 
 
Public debate on the desirable features of a new public service for post-apartheid South 
Africa began during the transition to the democratic elections held in 1994. The debate 
continued after the elections and the Minister of Public Service, a highly respected 
veteran of the anti-apartheid struggle and one of the chieftains of the ruling African 
National Congress (ANC), assumed the role of cabinet-level champion of public service 
reform. To prepare the ground for government decisions on the subject, members of the 
reform committee went on study tours to selected countries in both developed and 
developing countries. Furthermore, two workshops were organized in 1995 and 1996: the 
former was focused on learning lessons from the experiences of other African countries 
while the latter was focused on learning lessons from the experiences of other 
Commonwealth countries. Participants in the workshops were drawn from the central 
government, provincial government, parliament, academia and selected civil society 
organizations. The minister attended sessions of both workshops. At each workshop, the 
South African participants made it clear to the other participants that they were interested 
                                                 
17 This country experience is based partly on Picard (1999) and Fraser-Moloketi and Robertson (2003), and 
partly on information obtained by the author during his participation in two workshops on public service 
reform held in South Africa in 1995 and 1996.    28 
 
 
in learning about good practices to adapt for use and bad practices to avoid. Just before 
the organization of the workshops, the government had produced a “White Paper” [policy 
document in Anglophone administrative terminology] on the transformation of the public 
service (1995). Taking into account the insights from the workshops and further debates 
within the country, government proceeded to take decisions on the fundamental 
principles that would govern the public service and on its structures, functions, and 
operational methods.  
 
The fundamental principles are enshrined in the country’s 1996 constitution, and further 
elaboration is provided in the 1997 Public Service Act. In addition to the constitution and 
the Public Service Act, the legal and legislative framework for running the public service 
include the following: White Paper on public service education and training (1997), 
Skills Development Act (1997), Code of conduct for public servants (1997), Organized 
Local Government Act (1997), White Paper on Affirmative Action (1998), Employment 
Equity Act (1998), and White Paper on local government (1998). This legislative and 
legal framework for running the public service is arguably the most comprehensive in 
Africa. Evidence provided in the two sources on the South African experience cited 
above as well as evidence provided in the studies focused on assessments of public 
service reforms in SSA cited earlier suggest that the first years of implementing the 
public service reforms have helped to transform it into a well performing non-racial 
service that has made significant contributions to socioeconomic development in the 
country. All this qualify South Africa for inclusion in the group of “advance reformers” 
that are enjoying a virtuous cycle (see Table 1) 
 
Lessons from the South African Experience 
1.  Careful design of a public sector management reform program (including learning 
from the lessons of reform experiences in both developing and developed countries) 
that is an integral part of a national public sector reform strategy, itself linked to an 
overarching economic development and reconstruction strategy, results in a credible 
reform program. The participation of representatives of parliament and selected 
stakeholders from the private and voluntary sectors at the reform design stage 
enhances the credibility of the program and the chances of successful implementation. 
2.  Emergence of reform champions in critical positions (especially at the cabinet level, 
at the leadership level of the public service, and in parliament) is essential for success. 
Continuity in strong reform leadership at the cabinet level, especially during the first 
five to eight or ten years of reform implementation would ensure prompt and 
appropriate adjustment of reform program and initial implementation with some 
results on the ground that helps to generate broad-based support for reform within 
society. The first cabinet-level champion of reform served during a 4-year 
presidential term and his successor who was also a strong champion of reform served 
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4.3  Botswana: Role of a Competent Administration in Achieving an  
Impressive Development Performance 
 
In an overview of Botswana’s public administration published in the late 1990s
18, the 
authors observed as follows: 
There is a consensus in the literature on governance and public management issues in 
post-independence Botswana on the quality of the public administration and its key role 
in the country’s impressive development performance: high GDP growth rates for many 
years, combined with significant poverty reduction, a fairly high degree of political and 
economic participation, and relatively accountable and honest government.
19 
 
The governmental administrative system inherited from the colonial power at 
independence has been nurtured over the three post-independence decades into a 
competent and reasonably honest instrument to assist the political executive in the 
formulation and implementation of development policies and programs. The impressive 
development performance recorded in Botswana during the past two decades (an average 
GDP growth of 9.2 percent per annum from 1970 to 1995, which was the highest in the 
world) is due, in large part, to its solid institutional infrastructure.  
 
The authors cited the following, among others: 
•  Botswana has the reputation of a country in which the rule of law, assured by an 
independent court system, is predictable. 
•  Official financial transactions are transparent insofar as Botswana adheres to standard 
international accounting, reporting and auditing standards. 
•  On the whole, the quality of successive plans has been very high (both in respect of 
its rigor and realism) and the implementation record has been impressive, including 
the successful management of the diamond “boom” of the 1980s. 
 
According to another observer, “the [Botswana] public service has been generally well 
respected, and it enjoys the confidence of the political elites for its professionalism”. And 
he continues: “Botswana’s record of performance has been made possible, to a large 
extent, by the quality of its public administration, the caliber of people employed in it, 
and the appropriateness of the institutions and processes put in place.”
20 
 
Another observation about Botswana’s achievement of a well-performing public service 
is the commitment of successive presidents to continuous administrative reform, similar 
to the good practice in other countries with well performing public services such as the 
Canada, France, Japan, Singapore, and the United Kingdom. In the country’s successive 
Development Plans, public management reform features prominently and the subject also 
                                                 
18 See Adamolekun and Morgan (1999).  
19 In recent years, Botswana’s high rate of HIV/AIDS infection has significantly reduced its erstwhile high 
rating in “Human Development”. For example, life expectancy has fallen from 60.3 years in 1992 to 44.7 in 
2001. [Life Expectancy rose from 46 in 1960 to 52 in 1975, 59 in 1987 and 60.3 in 1992]. Source: UNDP: 
Human Development Report, various issues between 1990 and 2003. 
20 See Ayeni (1999). Similar observations on the quality of Botswana’s public administration are contained 
in several articles focused on Botswana’s impressive development performance; see, for example, Good 
(1992).   30 
 
 
features prominently in its “Vision 2016”. The main points in a recent laudatory overview 
of the Botswana experience that is consistent with our virtuous cycle hypothesis are 
provided in Box 8. 
 
 
Box 8: Overview of Botswana Experience 
[Botswana is] Africa’s longest-running democracy [… ]. The country has a good claim to be the 
best-run democracy in Africa. Botswana’s 1.8 m people are among the continent’s wealthiest, 
after four decades of fast economic growth. International surveys suggest they are Africa’s least 
corrupt…along with South Africa, it is the easiest place to do business in Africa. Good 
institutions, stable economic policies and a smart use of technology make it more competitive 
than, say, Brazil or Mexico… Botswana’s rulers keep their fingers out of the honey pot. 
Botswana’s …presidents have been honest. They have made sound policies, ensure that civil 
servants implement them and leave office dutifully when the constitution says so, after a 
maximum of ten years.  
Source: The Economist (London), November 6, 2004, page 52. 
 
 
Lessons from Botswana’s “success story”: 
1.  A leader who is at the same time an institution builder and development-oriented is a 
distinct advantage in the quest for a well performing public administration system. 
Botswana has been in the fortunate position of having, during the first four decades of 
its independence, a succession of presidents who fit the mould that the French 
philosopher Montesquieu referred to in one of his many insightful observations on the 
governance of societies: “At the birth of societies, it is the leaders of the 
commonwealth [state] who create institutions; afterwards, it is the institutions that 
shape the leaders.” 
2.  Administrative reform is a continuous exercise and it tends to develop its own 
momentum that successive political leadership teams as well as successive 
administrative leadership teams would deepen, in varying degrees, depending on 
prevailing circumstances within and outside the country. 
3.  Sound economic policies - honestly and efficiently managed (natural resource 
endowment helps) - an emphasis on educational development, and conscious 
nurturing of a democratic political culture, including respect for rule of law, create an 
environment in which good governance, socioeconomic progress, and a well 
functioning public service co-exist in a mutually reinforcing manner. This is what I 
referred to earlier as a virtuous cycle. 
 
4.4  Togo: Half-Hearted Efforts to Modernize a Decaying Civil Service 
 
During interviews conducted by the author in 2001/2002, senior public officials in Togo 
(a minister and several senior civil servants) stated that the main thrusts of the 
government’s proposed civil service modernization efforts were: (i) revision of the statute 
of the civil service with a view to incorporating new ideas such as emphasis on neutrality 
of civil servants, transparency, honesty and efficiency (the statute adopted in 1968 has   31 
 
 
never been revised); (ii) human resources management (including staff reduction and 
functional review); (iii) professional training, including the strengthening of the National 
School of Administration; and (iv) decentralization. An Inter-Ministerial Commission 
was to be appointed to develop a modernization strategy, including an implementation 
plan. More than a year after the decision was announced, the chair of the Commission 
who was the Director of the Civil Service was still unable to convene the first meeting 
because the members to be nominated from the coordinating ministries (Finance and 
Planning) and the Office of the Prime Minister had not been designated.  
 
Another illustration of half-hearted attention to civil service modernization is the failure 
of the government to implement the guidelines of the sub-regional organization, West 
Africa Economic and Monetary Union, regarding wage bill control (wage bill not to 
exceed 40% of government revenue in the late 1990s, with 35% as the target for 2002). A 
manpower audit was organized by a joint team of officials from the Civil Service 
Department and the Military in 1997. The objective was not achieved as the wage bill 
remained at over 50% of revenues. Two subsequent audits undertaken in 2000 and March 
2001 made no difference. The latest round of audit, undertaken exclusively by the 
military, was launched in September 2001 and the results had not been made public by 
mid-2003.  
 
Significantly, the desirable administrative reform (modernization) issues identified by 
participants involved in three Focus Group Discussion sessions organized in 2002 are 
broadly similar to those in the government’s outline agenda for modernizing the civil 
service (see Table 3). The participants in the Focus Group Discussion sessions were 
drawn from the government, civil society and academia, and the private sector. In other 
words, there is broad consensus among all the key stakeholders on what needs to be done; 
it is government’s willingness to act that is lacking. The Focus Group Discussion 
participants not only linked the decline in the capacity of the civil service to the poor 
performance of the economy in the last decade or so, they were also of the view that 
turning the situation around would require faithful implementation of the reform 
measures they recommended. 
 
Lessons from Togo’s hesitant approach to reform: 
1.  There is need for champions of reform at the level of the strategic leadership groups 
(political and administrative) in the machinery of government. In the absence of 
reform champions at these levels, the first steps towards reform design would not 
even happen in spite of the clarity of views and strong similarities in the public 
management reform priority actions identified by senior civil servants, leading private 
sector economic operators and articulate leaders of civil society groups.  
2.  With a public administration in decline and a poor performing economy, both linked 
to problems in the governance environment (political uncertainties due, in large part, 
to an incumbent president in his 38
th year of rule that is sustained by a patronage 
system; allegations of violations of human rights from time to time; virtual absence of 
oversight institutions; and strong evidence of systemic corruption), it is a case that is   32 
 
 
close to the vicious cycle of the governance/public management continuum mentioned 















•  Depoliticize the 
administration.  
 
•  Redefinition of the 
role and functions of 
the state and the civil 
service. 
 
•  Decentralize public 
services (implement 
Law N°. 98-006 on 
decentralization). 








•  Civic education for civil 
servants and the 
beneficiaries of public 
services. 
 
•  Depoliticize the 
administration. 
 
•  Decentralize public 
services (implement Law 
N°. 98-006 on 
decentralization).  
 
•  Training and re-training 
of civil servants. 
 





•  Good governance 
(human rights, efficient 
management of public 
finances and redefinition 
of the role of the state). 
 
•  Improved management of 
human resources 




•  Decentralize public 
services (implement Law 
N°. 98-006 on 
decentralization).  
 
•  Participation of the 
private sector in the 
formulation of policies 




                                                 





Chapter 5: Conclusions 
 
5.1   Toward Achieving Better and Sustainable Public Management  
Reform Results  
 
Arising from the issues in public sector management re-orientation examined in this 
paper, the main point that needs to be addressed in seeking to help SSA countries achieve 
better results from their reform efforts can be summed up as helping countries move from 
a vicious cycle to a virtuous cycle, in the sense in which the two terms are used in 
Chapter 2. In other words, countries and their (donor) partners should devote attention 
and resources to how best to transform both the governance and management situations 
in all countries interested in public management reform towards the virtuous cycle end of 
the continuum indicated at the bottom of Table 2. Because of the initial weak institutional 
conditions in countries in Groups D and C, and the overall disabling environment 
(including poor socioeconomic conditions), leapfrogging to Group A is very unlikely. 
Besides, the fortunate succession of development-oriented political leaders and the 
continuous commitment of both the political and administrative leadership teams to 
public management reform on a continuing basis would happen only very rarely. In most 
cases, Group D countries would need to pass through the stage of becoming “committed 
reformers” (Group B) – leapfrogging the Group C (“hesitant reformers”) would not be 
too difficult - and then, move incrementally toward Group A. The rare exception would 
be a country where a “window of opportunity” produces a visionary and development-
oriented leader who sets the country on a fast track toward Group A. For countries that 
are already in Group B, they would need to continue with incremental progress toward 
Group A. The danger they need to avoid is backsliding into Group C. Similarly, countries 
in Group C should endeavor to avoid backsliding to Group D.  
 
An important dimension to achieving better and sustainable public management reform 
that is valid for countries that aim to join Group A and avoid future reversal is the need 
for serious attention to learning and research on public services. (It is assumed that 
countries already in Group A would continue to pay attention to both subjects). On 
learning, the objective for each country should be to turn its public service into a learning 
organization in which all staff will be exposed to life-long learning. The political 
leadership team of each public service should also be exposed to appropriate education 
and training programs, as already suggested elsewhere in this paper. The lesson from 
ancient times (notably Greece and China) is that knowledge is relevant for the exercise of 
power and those who exercise both political and administrative power need to acquire 
relevant knowledge on a continuing basis. In many countries where management 
development and training institutes (MDTIs) and their equivalents have suffered from 
neglect, their rehabilitation should be a priority and the largely ad hoc training programs 
under ongoing reform programs need to become systematic through adoption of training 
policies that are properly funded and fully implemented. Regarding research on public 
services to be conducted within MDTIs or appropriate research institutes or 
faculties/departments of universities, there would be need for provision of adequate   34 
 
 
resources on a continuing basis. A priority list of topics for research on public services 
should include the following: public sector governance, incentives for effective service 
delivery, impact of HIV/AIDS on human resource development, impact of culture on 
public management, and implications of globalization for national public administration 
systems. 
 
5.2 Toward  an  African  Administrative Space 
 
One possible future initiative that could be developed under the auspices of NEPAD 
(possibly with financial and intellectual support from AFDB) is an imitation of an 
excellent initiative of the European Union relating to the promotion of quality public 
administration systems in its member states. In 1997, the EU decided to place 
administrative issues on its enlargement agenda and some “administrative conditions” of 
membership eventually emerged. It is the main thrusts of these conditions that are 
sometimes referred to as constituting the “European Administrative Space”.
22 Although 
there is as yet no single European “administration model” the “attractiveness” of some 
features of public administration that are common in all existing fifteen EU member 
states as a result of mutual borrowing over centuries (with only minor differences) – for 
example, a professional, non-political civil service - together with the “imposition” of 
some administrative texts and formal arrangements that are essential for effective and 
uniform implementation of many EU policies constitute what some refer to as the 
European Administrative Space. In the SSA situation, there are two possible roots that 
are also complementary. First, there is an emerging convergence in certain aspects of 
public administration among the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
member states (for example, annual conferences of auditors general, accountants general, 
and so on) to share experiences. SDAC member states are seeking to adopt a common 
anti-corruption strategy and action plan that would co-exist with national strategies and 
action plans. In West Africa, member states of the West African Economic and Monetary 
Union (WAEMU) have adopted common principles and practices in certain areas of 
public administration such as budget and public financial management (including 
common administrative texts and procedures) and civil service wage bill management. 
The common colonial administrative heritage shared by most member states in the two 
sub-regional organizations is a strong factor for the convergence. Like the EU, too, the 
need for uniform and effective implementation of each organization’s policies must have 
played a role in the trend toward convergence. Other sub-regional organizations in 
Eastern, Central and West African could move in similar directions. 
 
Simultaneously with these developments within sub-regional organizations, the first steps 
towards a Pan-African Administrative Space could be embarked upon, closely linked to 
the governance issues addressed in the APRM: democracy and political governance; 
economic governance and management; corporate governance; and socio-economic 
development. A starting point could be the principles underpinning the “Charter for the 
Public Service in Africa” adopted at the Third Pan-African Conference of the Ministers 
                                                 
22 For an informative narrative on an evolving “European Administrative Space”, see Olsen (2002).  
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of Civil Service held in Windhoek, Namibia, 2001. The four principles are: (i) principle 
of equality of treatment; (ii) principle of neutrality; (iii) principle of legality; and (iv) 
principle of continuity. Whilst this effort focused on a charter has its own merits and 
deserves to be taken into account, the principles and criteria to be adopted would need to 
have a broader orientation, including issues of economic management (linked to 
economic and corporate governance), accountability and transparency, and administrative 
competence. A future research program focused on public services could explore the 
desirability or otherwise of this suggestion, beginning with an assessment of the value 
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